migrants from the U.S., allowing for a general equilibrium reallocation of American workers and capital across occupations. The distribution of wage effects is highly skewed: the largest wage decrease is just 1.5%, but a few occupations have wage increases as high as 64%. The median of the absolute value of wage changes is just 0.6%. The evidence suggests that most (but not all) Americans are able to respond to immigration by substituting into similar occupations that are intensive in communications, experience, or training, and experience only small wage changes. The differential effects of low and high-skilled immigration are also estimated. * Thanks to Curtis Simon, Kevin Murphy, and the Bag Lunch participants at Clemson University for helpful comments on early work, and to Tom Mroz for generous advice and use of computational resources. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
Immigrants to the United States tend to concentrate into certain occupations. For instance, they account for as little as 0.5% and as much as 45% of total employment across 453 Censuslevel occupations in the year 2000. Two conflicting popular narratives for this concentration are that immigrants take jobs Americans don't want, or that immigrants drive down wages and push Americans out of jobs. This paper explores the effects of immigration on the distribution of wages and employment across occupations.
To make progress in these distributional questions, it is important to understand two points: why immigrants select the occupations that they do; and how effectively Americans can substitute out of occupations that see an influx of immigrant workers. This paper proposes that the way to understand both of these issues is through the lens of human capital.
It develops a theory of labor markets similar to recent work by Lazear (2003) . Human capital is a vector of different attributes, such as physical skills and education, rather than a scalar. Workers have heterogeneous endowments over possible combinations of human capital: some are educated and clumsy, educated and nimble, and so on. Occupations all use capital and labor hours in the same fashion, but vary in how they combine the human capital vector into output. Some occupations are physical skill-intensive, while others are education-intensive. In equilibrium, workers tend to choose occupations intensive in the skills that they possess abundantly.
In this model, an immigrant is someone whose human capital is different from an American (or whose human capital is drawn from a different distribution than that of Americans).
Human capital differences can come from differences in environment (such as school quality) or from the selection process that determines who immigrates, but the source is not important. What is important is that human capital differences explain differences in occupational choices between immigrants and Americans.
Estimates of human capital are needed to conduct counterfactual simulations and explore the role of immigration on wage distributions. For some of the elements of human capital the Census provides direct information (e.g. education), but for others it does not (e.g. physical skills, cognitive ability). Instead of using the direct but limited information on human capital, this paper uses an indirect measurement approach. It constructs information on the skill intensity of occupations and on the occupation choices of workers by country of birth. With these two pieces of information it then infers the human capital of workers that is consistent with their observed occupational choices. which uses task information to characterize occupations as being manual or interactive.
They demonstrate that low-skilled immigrants specialize in the former while American-born workers specialize in the latter, so that they are much less substitutable than is commonly thought.
Empirical implementation yields estimates of the human capital of workers from 130 different countries along the 5 skill dimensions, all relative to the average American. Where Census data provide direct measures of human capital, the direct and indirect measures are highly correlated; but indirect measurement also provides estimates of the human capital endowments of difficult to observe attributes such as cognitive ability. In general, most immigrants have more cognitive ability but less communication skills than the average American. Immigrants from developed countries tend to have more experience and training, while immigrants from developing countries tend to be abundant in physical skills.
To estimate the effect of immigrants on the distribution of wages and employment by Americans, I simulate two counterfactual general equilibrium outcomes, corresponding to an equilibrium with all immigrants removed, and an equilibrium with low-skilled immigrants removed. I proxy low-skilled immigrants as immigrants from the fifteen countries with the highest rates of estimated illegal immigration. These simulations allow for general equilibrium reallocations of capital and workers across occupations. The extent to which workers substitute across occupations is governed by two factors. First, there is an aggregate elasticity of substitution between the outputs of different occupations, which determines how easily legal services can be substituted for medical services in producing the final aggregate consumption good. Second is the technological similarity of the two occupations; workers are more willing to substitute between technogically similar occupations such as physicist and engineer because their marginal product and hence wages will be similar in the two occupations.
I compare wages and employment across the actual and the two simulated economies.
The central finding of the paper is that immigration makes a small difference in the wages of most workers, but a large difference for a few occupations. A majority of occupations see a wage change of less than 1% in all simulated cases. The distribution of wage changes is highly skewed: excluding immigrants lowers wages by at most 2% in any occupation, but increases wages by as much as 64% in a few occupations. The size of wage gains is determined by how the occupation's technological intensity matches up with immigrants' skills, and the presence of nearby substitutes. In particular, since all immigrants are scarce in communication skills, and low-skilled immigrants are scarce in experience and training, occupations intensive in these skills do well from immigration. Workers in these occupations, or workers who can easily substitute into these occupations, likewise do well. The fact that most wage changes are small suggests that most workers find it easy to substitute into such an occupation.
There is a large related literature on the effects of immigrants on wages, but most previous studies focus on effects on aggregate wages, or on a world with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled. This paper is most closely related to three previous studies. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) shares a general equilibrium framework with capital. They note that the effect of immigration on wages differs in the short run (when the capital stock is fixed) and the long run (when capital is free to adjust). This paper embeds an even longer view of the long run, where capital and occupations are both free to adjust. Peri and Sparber (2007) shows that immigrants specialize in manual occupations and suggests that this may limit competition by immigrants, which is mirrored here by the ability of Americans to substitute into communications-intensive occupations when they are available.
However, I find that for some occupations no effective substitute is available, so Americans with tastes or skills suitable to those occupations face large wage losses from immigration. Borjas (2005) studies the relationship between foreign-student enrollment in U.S. doctoral programs and wages paid to the graduates of those programs. Broadly speaking, his results suggest that immigrants have sorted into degree programs that are relatively less intensive in communications (such as physics instead of sociology) and depressed relative wages of those programs, which is similar to the effect predicted for engineering and science occupations in this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 illustrates the main properties of the model and the assumptions under which it is estimable. Section 4 introduces the data and estimates the human capital endowments of immigrants. Section 5 conducts the experiments using measured skills. Section 6 concludes.
A Model of Labor Markets with Vector Human Capital 2.1 Occupations and Human Capital
The model is a static representation of labor markets. Human capital H is an array of S elements, H = (h 1 , h 2 , ..h S ), with a representative element indexed by h s . Each s denotes a specific type of human capital, which I call a skill, although it may also include abilities, training, or any of the other common notions of human capital. For instance, a common specification would be S = 2, with human capital consisting of physical and mental abilities.
Human capital endowments are defined on (0, ∞)
S .
There are J occupations in the economy, indexed by j. Each occupation utilizes all of the available skills of workers, but occupations vary in how intensively they use each of the skills. An occupation is characterized by a set of technological parameters (ω j s ) S s=1 . The effective labor input of a worker with human capital H who works n j (H) hours in occupation j is given by:
Skill endowments can be greater than or less than 1. For h s > 1, workers are more productive in higher ω j s occupations; for h s < 1, they are less productive.
Firms
For every occupation, there exists a continuum of firms that employ workers of only that occupation. Firms hire workers and rent capital from households, then sell the produced occupational outputs to a final goods producer. Firms post wage schedules W j (H) giving the wage that they would be willing to pay for each possible endowment of skills, and a number of hours L j (H) that they would like to hire at that wage. Given the large number of firms, the posted wage contracts will offer exactly each worker's marginal product. Firms also take the rental price of capital R as given and rent a quantity K j (H) of capital for each type of worker. Firms find it optimal to vary capital allocated to workers with different levels of human capital.
Output Y j (H) of workers H in occupation j is the usual Cobb-Douglas aggregate over capital K j (H), effective labor input, and labor-augmenting technology A that is general across occupations. Firms choose capital and hours for each skill type to maximize profits per skill type:
The first-order conditions are given by:
There is a single price-taking final goods producer. The producer faces prices P j and purchases quantities of occupational outputs X j . It aggregates the occupational outputs using a CES production function with elasticity of substitution ψ. It sells its output Y to consumers for consumption. I normalize the price of the final good to be the numeraire of the economy. Then the final goods producer maximizes profits:
The usual CES relative demand conditions apply here:
Workers
Workers have additively separable preferences over consumption and time spent in the labor market. Their preferences over consumption c are given by a standard CRRA function.
Their preferences over time spent in the labor market depend on hours of work and the occupation where those hours are worked. Thus, the disutility of a forty-hour workweek may vary depending on whether the forty hours are spent working as a lawyer or a landscaper.
These preferences are specific to the worker. I denote by ε j the idiosyncratic preference of a worker for occupation j.
Workers have two forms of heterogeneity: in their skill endowments, H, and in their preferences for occupations ε = (ε j ) J j=1 . I describe a worker by her skills and preferences, (H, ε), so c(H, ε) is the consumption of such a worker, and so on. (H, ε) is a random draw from a joint distribution with pdf ξ(H, ε) and cdf Ξ(H, ε) which is defined on (0, ∞) S × (0, ∞) J . I assume that both ξ and Ξ are integrable and well-behaved so that expected utility exists; in the next section I restrict ξ so that this is true.
Given a worker's skill endowment and her draw of occupational preferences, her utility function is given by:
Workers are also endowed with a(H) units of capital. Their income comes from renting out their endowment of capital at rate R and from their wages J j=1 w j (H)n j (H, ε). They spend their income on consumption, c(H, ε), so their budget constraint is:
Workers choose consumption, hours worked, and occupations to maximize their utility, subject to their budget constraint and the time restriction J j=1 n j (H, ε) ≤N . One key feature of the problem is that the log preferences guarantee the choice of a unique occupation that depends only on wage offers and occupational tastes ε.
Proposition 1 -Independence of Occupational Choice
The workers' choice problem can be analyzed in two separate pieces. First, they choose the occupation that maximizes w j (H)ε j . Second, they choose consumption and hours, which are independent of their taste realizations ε.
Proof: Combine the FOC for consumption and hours worked to find that for occupations with positive hours:
with n j = 0 otherwise. As long as ξ is continuous, this equation will hold for only one occupation. Then substitute into equations (4) and (5) to find the equivalent problem:
The only term that depends on occupational choice is log(w
is independent of ε, and by the first-order conditions, so too is n(H, ε). QED For the rest of the paper, I omit the irrelevant ε when possible, using only c(H). Hours worked n(H) also does not vary with tastes ε, but the occupation chosen does. I let d j (H, ε) be an indicator function taking a value of 1 if worker (H, ε) chooses occupation j, and taking 0 otherwise. Given the functional form of this equivalent problem, ε j represents the compensating wage differential across occupations. If a worker's draw ε j for lawyer is twice that of her draw for fire fighter, her wage as a fire fighter needs to be twice her wage as a lawyer to make her indifferent between the two occupations.
Equilibrium
There are four sets of market clearing conditions for this economy: one condition for output, one condition for capital, one condition for each of the occupational goods markets, and one condition for each type of human capital. They are given by:
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of prices (P j , R, W (H)), allocations for the work-
and allocations for the final goods producer (Y, X j ) that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Taking prices as given, workers maximize their utility (4) subject to their budget constraint (5) and time restriction
Taking prices as given, intermediate firms maximize profits, (1).
3. Taking prices as given, the final goods producer maximizes profits, (2) 4. Markets clear, (6) -(9).
Equilibrium Predictions
The model of labor markets here is similar to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade (Heckscher 1949 , Ohlin 1933 . Workers vary in their endowment of skills, and have access to a number of occupations that vary in their skill intensity. I show that a pseudo-Rybczynski Theorem holds: workers who are more s-abundant have a higher probability of choosing occupations that are s-intensive, when s-intensity is appropriately defined. Introducing idiosyncratic tastes is not only realistic, but also convenient because it makes choices continuous in endowments and the results easier to characterize.
Allocation of Workers to Occupations
In equilibrium, the wage offered to worker H if she chooses occupation j is given by:
Workers choose the occupation j that maximizes the product of wages and the idiosyncratic preference for occupation j. I respecify this as maximization in logs for convenience:
The model can be estimated under a variety of assumptions on ξ(H, ε). However, two assumptions are particularly helpful in making the estimation computationally tractable.
First is an assumption over the joint distribution:
Assumption 1 -Independence of Tastes and Endowments
The distribution ξ(H, ε) can be decomposed into two independent marginal distributions, f (H) and g(ε), with F and G as the corresponding CDF's.
Note that this assumption does not rule out skill endowment affecting occupational choice.
It merely constrains the effects to come through the wage channel. This assumption can be relaxed; intuitively, as long as workers are more likely to choose occupations in which they are more productive, then the estimation used here will be able to infer their productivities.
Whether they choose that occupation because they value high wages or because they derive non-pecuniary satisfaction out of being good at their occupation is less critical.
The second assumption is over the functional form of the idiosyncratic preferences:
is distributed i.i.d according to the Type-I extreme value distribution.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are used mostly to make estimation computationally practical, although they are also useful for deriving clean propositions about the model. The extreme value distribution means that this problem fits into the probablistic choice framework of McFadden (1974) . It is amenable to estimation using various logit methods; I consider the conditional and mixed logit approaches in the next section. Logit models are well-known to be more practical than alternatives such as multinomial probits for estimating data sets with large sample size and a large number of variables; I have both. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the probability that a worker chooses occupation j conditional on human capital H is given by:
Cancelling out the log and exponential terms, the probability that a worker chooses occupation j is merely the wage that she would earn in occupation j, divided by the sum of the wages she could earn in each possible occupation. By a usual law of large numbers argument, q(j |H) also represents the fraction of workers with endowment H who choose occupation j . One convenient result of using the logistic framework is that it is straightforward to give the comparative statics results. For this model the key comparative static is how changes in a worker's skill abundance affects her probability of matching in each of the J occupations.
Proposition 2 -Psuedo-Rybczynski Theorem
A marginal increase in log(h s ) makes a worker more likely to work in occupations that are more s-intensive than the expected local alternative and less likely to work in occupations that are less s-intensive than the expected local alternative.
The proposition comes directly from the usual marginal effects equation in a conditional logit model.
1 It is the analogue to the Rybczynski Theorem from trade: an increase in sabundance makes a worker more likely to choose s-intensive occupations. With multiple choices and idiosyncratic preferences, an occupation is s-intensive if its intensity parameter ω j s is higher than the probability-weighted local alternative for a given worker. An important and related question is what would happen to wages and occupational choices if all workers became more s-abundant. Proposition 2 is inherently partial equilibrium, so it offers little guidance to these questions. In the next section, I provide a general equilibrium result.
1 The exact equation is
Prices and Wages in General Equilibrium
The wages offered to workers who choose two different occupations will in general depend on the prices offered for the output of those occupations, as can be seen by equation (10). Prices are determined in general equilibrium to allocate labor across occupations in a way that is consistent with the CES demand equation of the final goods producer (3). The primary determinant of the prices is the abundance of different types of skills. Relative prices (and hence relative wages) are inversely proportional to a weighted average of effective human capital:
A more straightforward way to see the effect of a reallocation of the distribution of labor across skill types for relative prices is to consider the comparative static of marginal changes in the density:
Proposition 3 -Skill Abundance and Prices
If workers with human capitalĤ are a higher proportion of labor input for occupation j than occupation j , then an increase in the abundance of those workers f (Ĥ) decreases the price and wages of j relative to j .
Proof: The comparative static of relative prices (and hence relative wages) with respect to density f (Ĥ) is:
The sign of the whole expression depends on the sign of:
An increase in the abundance of immigrants abundant in a particular skill will lower the relative wages of occupations intensive in that skill.
An Application to Immigrants
To apply this framework to immigrants, I examine the distribution of skills conditional on country of origin. Let f (H|i) denote the distribution of skills for a worker who was born in country i and η i denote the fraction of the U.S. labor force born in country i, i = 1..I. If H were observed, then q(j |H) is given by equation (11). Since only i is observed, it is necessary to study the conditional probability q(j |i) by integrating over all possible human capital realizations:
This equation has the general form of a mixed logit. To proceed, I assume that f (H|i) is
given by a particular distribution with a limited set of parameters θ i that vary by country.
The prices can be estimated as occupation fixed effects. Then given data on the skillintensity of occupations ω, the mixed logit allows me to estimate the parameters θ i . 2 In the next section I introduce the data and estimate f (H|i) under two different assumptions about the possible form of the conditional distribution.
Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is to construct indirect measures of human capital of workers conditional on country of origin. To do so, I construct measures of skill intensity of occupations using occupational task data, and take from Census data the occupational choices of work- 
Data
The data for this project are taken from two sources. I gather data on the occupations and characteristics of immigrants from the 5% sample of the 2000 U.S. Census, drawn from the IPUMS-USA system (Ruggles, Sobek, Alexander, Fitch, Goeken, Hall, King, and Ronnander 2004) . The Census asks every respondent to list their country of birth. For privacy reasons, it aggregates this data so that no birthplace with fewer than 10,000 reported immigrants is reported separately. After aggregation, there are observations for I = 131 different birthplaces, including the United States. Some of the birthplaces are nonstandard; for instance, there are response categories for Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia, since immigrants may have departed before or after the split. I preserve every statistical entity which is separately identified, and refer to them as countries as a shorthand. I am sensitive to the criticism that with such a wealth of information at hand, there are many possible skills to estimate and many possible ways to construct the indices for skills.
I view this exercise as a useful starting point in using this extremely rich data source. Each of the five skills is a relatively commonly discussed component of human capital. They are also particularly applicable when studying immigrants. A common finding in the literature on the occupations of immigrants is that immigrants tend to come from the two tails of the skill distribution (Ottaviano and Peri 2006) . This finding corresponds to a trade-off between physical skills and cognitive ability or education. Cognitive ability is also important in discussing immigrant selection. Communication is of interest given the large language barrier that many immigrants face. Finally, experience and training are important for the purpose of measuring the transferability of skills across countries. 
Checks on Intensity Measures
According to Proposition 2, workers who are more s-abundant should choose occupations that are s-intensive. Here, I perform a preliminary, joint test of the model and the measures of skill intensity. The Census provides some proxies for the skill endowments of workers. I thus test whether there is an observed correlation between abundance in these proxies for skill endowment and the skill intensity of the worker's chosen occupation. I implement this by regressing:
where ω j s is the constructed skill intensity of the worker's chosen occupation andh s is the proxy for skill endowment. I then test whether b 2 > 0.
For each of the skills I construct a proxy for abundance. Educational attainment is 5 One common alternative would be to include all the variables in a large PCA analysis and extract the first n components. However, there is a problem with interpretability of the results. For instance, a common component from such an analysis relates caring for others, exposure to disease, knowledge of biology and chemistry, and advanced college education requirements. These characteristics describe a pool of occupations (doctor, nurse) and not a set of related, deep technologies. In general, PCA cannot sort out factors that tend to be correlated because they are manifestations of a single technological parameter, and factors that tend to be correlated because many occupations have similar skill requirements. For the purposes of this estimation I want to separate the two: are there so few Mexican doctors because of the education requirements, the communication requirements, or the training requirements? Doing so requires imposing priors as I have done here. For communication and education, the effect is also large: these are the two best proxy measures. 6 All the coefficients have the right sign except for physical disability. This sign may be due to a reverse causality problem: workers with more physically demanding occupations may also be more likely to suffer disabilities from their work.
From these tests I conclude that the constructed measures of skill intensity and the theoretical predictions are reasonable. However, the data limitations for information on the skills of workers is binding. In the next two sections, I use the theory to back out the implied skill endowments.
Estimation as a Conditional Logit
To estimate equation (13), I impose further structure on the possible functional forms of the conditional distribution f (H|i). The simplest assumption would be that the conditional distribution has a degenerate distribution placing all the mass on a single point, with that point differing by country of origin. Then all workers born in country i have the same skills.
Assumption 3 -Point Distribution of Skills
Under this condition equation (13) simplifies to:
This function has the form of the conditional logit as introduced by McFadden (1974) . As is standard for a conditional logit, it is not possible to estimate a full set of prices and skill endowments because of collinearity. However, I can identify a set of related parameters: The estimates are presented in Table 4 , along with their statistical significance and the number of observations for each country. Rather than discussing each of the 650 relative skill endowments separately, I identify broad trends. I am interested in how immigrants compare to Americans in general, and in differences across immigrant groups by the development status of their source country. A useful summary of the trends is given graphically in Figures   1 and 2 . These figures are scatter plots of the estimated log skill difference against PPP GDP p.c. in the source country for each of the five skills, for each country for which data is available.
7 Figure 1 contains the communication skills, cognitive ability, and education, These estimates were all constructed under several very strong assumptions about the conditional skill distribution of immigrants, particularly that all immigrants from a given country have the same skills. In the next section I consider the mixed logit framework, which relaxes this and other assumptions.
Estimation as a Mixed Logit
Estimation using a conditional logit requires that all immigrants have identical skill endowments, as in Assumption (3). More realistically, immigrants from a given country may represent a heterogeneous population. To allow for this, I consider a more relaxed assumption on the conditional distribution f (H|i):
Assumption 4 -Heterogeneous Skills f (H|i) is distributed normally with mean µ i and diagonal variance-covariance matrix Σ i .
As with a conditional logit, there are restrictions on what I can estimate. In this case, I
can estimate the mean and standard deviation of log(h Finally, the mixed logit breaks the undesirable independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption that is built into the conditional logit. The independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption requires that the probability that a worker chooses occupation A over occupation B be independent of the number or type of available alternatives. For instance, it requires that the probability that a worker chooses fire fighter over podiatrist be independent of whether neurologist is in the choice set. Evidently, IIA is an assumption that is unrealistic in the case of occupational choice.
I estimate the mixed logit using 500 Halton draws, which speed the calculation of probabilities relative to more standard Monte Carlo techniques.
Estimation in progress.

Experiments Using Measured Skills
The estimated skills of immigrants are consistently different than the estimates skills of Americans, and show consistent variation by the development status of the source country.
In this section I conduct two sets of experiments using the model to shed light on the importance of these differences. First, since immigrants have different skills than Americans, by Proposition 3 they affect the distribution of wages by occupation. I use the model to study the size of the changes to the wage and employment distributions of removing all immigrants from the labor force. For many issues, it is illegal or unskilled immigration that is of particular policy interest. Hence, I also conduct a second experiment where I exclude immigrnats from the fifteen countries with the highest rates of illegal immigration.
Both experiments have certain common features. For convenience, I assume that σ = 1, so that hours of work is the same across different human capital endowments and countries of origin. Additionally, I assume that the equilibrium R is the same in both countries, which removes any effect of capital differences in the usual growth accounting sense. R might be equal because the economies are on balanced growth paths with identical preferences, or because the economies are open to capital flows. Finally, the results depend greatly on the value of ψ, the elasticity of substitution between the outputs of different occupations. To my knowledge no previous study has estimated a parameter of this type. Further, it is not clear whether the outputs of different occupations should even be considered substitutes or complements. I present estimates for a wide range of values for ψ; results are always greater for lower ψ.
For both sets of experiments, I use the conditional logit estimates. It is much simpler to perform computational experiments without approximating 650 distributions. I extract the actual skill endowments for each country from the estimated coefficients by applying the general equilibrium restrictions from the final goods producer as in equation (12). A convenient application of that equation to this special case is given by:
The terms in brackets correspond to the variables that are estimated in the conditional logit. Along with the choice of a numeraire, this equation is sufficient to separately identify prices and skill endowments.
With estimates of the skill endowments, I can conduct counterfactuals by studying the general equilibrium outcome in terms of wages and total output for economies with different skill distributions than that of my sample. The result is general equilibrium in the sense that workers can adjust their occupations to changes in the overall skill distribution, with the types of adjustment depending on their skills.
Effect of Removing All Immigrants
In this section I study the distributional implications of a world in which all immigrants are removed from the United States. To be clear, I study the changes in the wage distribution if the United States is composed of only the American-born workers who meet my sample selection criteria, instead of all workers who meet those criteria. Again, the sample includes only workers who immigrated after completing their schooling; I view this experiment as the more interesting one because workers who immigrate later in life are seemingly more contentious. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the distributional effects of excluding immigrants, for values of the elasticity of substitution ranging from strong complements to strong substitutes. For each ψ I present the largest wage decrease and increase seen for any occupation. Removing immigrants would seem to create large benefits for workers in some occupations against only small losses. These statistics are driven by a variable and highly skewed distribution of wage changes, as can be easily seen in Figure 3 , which plots the actual distribution of wage changes for ψ = 1. Most workers see only small changes.
This fact is confirmed by the middle row of Table 2 , which gives the median of the absolute value of the wage change; the average occupation sees at most a 1.5% change in their wages.
Another question of interest is which occupations are most affected by these changes. Table 3 gives information about the three occupations that would see the largest wage increase and decrease under the experiment. Generally speaking, occupations that would lose are those that are moderately skill-intensive across all of the categories but physical skills. They are particularly likely to include occupations that require a high degree of communication, which fits with the fact that most immigrants are scarce in communications skills. There are two distinct groups of occupations that would see wage increases. The first, including aerospace engineers and a few related occupations such as physicists, are highly intensive in cognitive ability and education. Since immigrants from developed countries possess these cognitive ability in abundance, removing them would raise wages in these occupations. The second, much larger group is occupations that are relatively unintensive across all skills except physical skills. The many developing country immigrants have skills appopriate for these occupations, and removing them tends to raise wages.
The results here are consistent with other general equilibrium results, particularly Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Peri and Sparber (2007) . Broadly, these papers find that in a general equilibrium model with capital adjustment, American and foreign workers are imperfect substitutes. They also find that immigration generally has small effects on wages, with only the least-skilled Americans seeing falling wages. This paper suggests that workers are imperfect substitutes because of large skill differences. In particular, Mexican immigrants (who form a large fraction of the total sample) are physical skill-abundant and scarce in all other skills relative to Americans. The Americans most likely to see negative wage effects from immigrants are those working in physical skill-intensive occupations. Finally, my results on the effects of high-skilled workers receive some support in the recent findings of Borjas (2005) . He shows that increases in the number of immigrants entering into U.S.
PhD programs in a particular field are associated with declines in the wages of doctoral graduates in that field. While these workers would not be included in my sample, I take these results as evidence that immigrants can depress wages for some specific high-skilled workers. Further, my results could help explain why immigrants study certain fields, such as hard sciences and engineering, more than others, such as social sciences. In particular, one could infer that a lack of communication skills makes more discussion-based subjects such as psychology and sociology less attractive. 
Effect of Removing Low-Skilled Immigrants
In progress.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a simple theory of labor markets where workers vary in their endowment of a vector of skills, and occupations vary in their intensity over the vector of skills. The key theoretical result is a pseudo-Rybczynski Theorem. Where sufficient data on human capital endowments are available, the Theorem seems broadly supported. Where data are not available, the model provides a tractable way to estimate human capital endowments. Implementation to estimate the skills of immigrants from different countries suggests interesting differences between Americans and immigrants, and between immigrants from different countries. Experiments using the general equilibrium model suggest that American workers see small wage changes as long as they can substitute into a communications or experience and training-intensive occupation, but that they may see large wage changes otherwise.
This model has abstracted from the skill accumulation decisions of workers by using an endowment framework. Additionally, it has purposefully taken a long-run view, leaving many short-run issues unexplored. Principal among these is the transition path of workers' careers as they respond to immigration and the costs that they pay to switch occupations.
These issues are left for future work.
10 See Table 1 of his paper for percentage foreign-born by field.
A Measures of Skill Intensity
A.1 Information Used
The O*NET database is built on a content model that divides occupational information into six broad categories: worker characteristics, worker requirements, experience requirements, occupation-specific information, workforce characteristics, and occupational requirements.
Within each of these six broad categories information is organized in a hierarchical format similar to the 1-digit, 2-digit, 3-digit format of industry and trade data. For instance, item anchors given are that a score of 2 is equivalent to ability to understand a television commercial; a score of 4 is equivalent to ability to understand a coach's oral instructions for a sport; and a score of 6 is equivalent to ability to understand a lecture on advanced physics.
Scores for each occupation-attribute are gathered either from the average score given by occupational analysts or the average score given by survey responses from incumbent workers. For instance, all oral comprehension scores are the average rating of eight analysts, while the mathematics skills score for chief executives is the average of 23 survey responses by actual chief executives.
From the 250+ most disaggregated categories I select those that correspond closely to one of the five skills. I also focus on information that is relatively unique to a specific skill.
The reported level anchors are helpful here. For example, I exclude oral comprehension ability because it is not clear from the anchors provided whether it measures a cognitive ability, a communication skill, or a mixture. I give a broad description of the information used in each skill here; the specific measures are provided in Tables (5) No occupation is repeated on this list, and more generally no cross-intensity correlation exceeds 0.60, implying sufficient variation to identify the skill components separately. 
